Taxpayer funding: the Hyde Amendment

Since 1976 Congress has attached the Hyde Amendment to the yearly health appropriations bill. It bars federal funds (mainly Medicaid) from paying for abortion except in cases of rape, incest or danger to the mother's life. The Supreme Court upheld this kind of rule even while Roe stood: in Maher v. Roe (1977) for a state's Medicaid program, in Harris v. McRae (1980) for the Hyde Amendment itself, and in Rust v. Sullivan (1991) for a rule keeping federal family-planning money out of abortion counselling and referral. The reasoning was the same each time: Roe stopped the government from putting obstacles in a woman's way, but did not oblige it to pay for abortion, and government may fund childbirth but not abortion.

What this settles
Refusing to pay for abortion does not violate the Constitution, even under Roe. In the Court's words, Roe 'implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds' (Maher, 432 U.S. at 474), and a government 'need not remove' obstacles 'not of its own creation' such as poverty (McRae, 448 U.S. at 316). McRae also held that a funding limit does not become an establishment of religion just because it agrees with Catholic teaching (448 U.S. at 319-320). The current Hyde text is §§506-507 of division B of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (Pub. L. 119-75), which also protects health-care entities that will not provide, pay for, cover or refer for abortions (§507(d)).
What it doesn't settle
These cases say only that the Constitution permits Congress to refuse to pay; they do not say it must refuse. Hyde is not permanent law: it is a rider that has to be passed again with every appropriations act, so a future Congress could drop it. It also does not stop states from paying for abortion with their own money (§507(b)), and a number of states do. Whether Planned Parenthood should get Medicaid money for its other services is a separate policy question, and the 2025 Medicaid restriction mentioned on card E42 is not covered here. Rust upheld a particular Title X regulation; whether that rule is in force depends on which administration's regulation currently applies, and we have not checked that here.
The record

Maher v. Roe

432 U.S. 464 (1977) · Decided 1977-06-20 · 6-3 · Opinion by Powell, J. (joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, White, Rehnquist, Stevens, JJ.); Burger, C.J., concurring statement; dissents by Brennan, J. (joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.), Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.
What it held
A State taking part in Medicaid does not have to pay for nontherapeutic (elective) abortions just because it pays for childbirth. Poverty alone is not a 'suspect class', and the funding rule does not interfere with the abortion right recognised in Roe.
Why
Roe protects a woman from 'unduly burdensome interference' with her decision; it does not give her a right to have the State pay. Refusing to fund puts no new obstacle in her path: she is in the same position she would be in if the State funded nothing. The Court distinguished 'direct state interference with a protected activity' from 'state encouragement of an alternative activity'. The State has a 'strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth', and paying for childbirth is a rational way to pursue it. Whether to fund abortion is a policy question for legislatures.
Status
Still good law. Its reasoning did not depend on Roe being right, and Dobbs left it untouched. It was relied on in Harris v. McRae, Webster and Rust.
In the Court's words
It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.Majority · 432 U.S. at 474
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.Majority · 432 U.S. at 474
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.Majority · 432 U.S. at 475
The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply divided.Majority · 432 U.S. at 479
This disparity in funding by the State clearly operates to coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children they would not otherwise choose to have, and just as clearly, this coercion can only operate upon the poor, who are uniquely the victims of this form of financial pressure.Dissent · 432 U.S. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting)

Connecticut's Medicaid program paid for childbirth but not for abortions that were not 'medically necessary'. The Court held that this did not violate equal protection or Roe. This is the source of the principle, repeated in McRae, Webster and Rust, that a State may favour childbirth over abortion with its money.

Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official U.S. Reports page scan (Library of Congress); wording cross-checked against the Cornell LII text; page numbers from the scan. Source

Harris v. McRae

448 U.S. 297 (1980) · Decided 1980-06-30 · 5-4 · Opinion by Stewart, J. (joined by Burger, C.J., White, Powell, Rehnquist, JJ.); White, J., concurring; dissents by Brennan, J. (joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.), Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.
What it held
(1) Medicaid does not require States to pay for abortions that the Hyde Amendment excludes from federal reimbursement. (2) The Hyde Amendment does not violate the Due Process Clause or the equal protection part of the Fifth Amendment. (3) It does not violate the Establishment Clause. The free-exercise claim was dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing.
Why
Following Maher, the Court said the government may not put obstacles in a woman's way but does not have to remove ones it did not create, such as poverty. A woman on Medicaid has the same choices she would have if the government funded no health care at all. A law does not become religious just because it agrees with a church's teaching; the Court's example was that laws against theft are not religious laws because Judaism and Christianity also forbid stealing. Congress could rationally treat abortion differently from other medical care because it alone 'involves the purposeful termination of a potential life'.
Status
Still good law, and the Hyde Amendment it upheld has been passed again every year since. The version at issue in 1980 had narrower exceptions than today's text.
In the Court's words
it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.Majority · 448 U.S. at 316
although government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category.Majority · 448 U.S. at 316
That the Judaeo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny.Majority · 448 U.S. at 319
In sum, we are convinced that the fact that the funding restrictions in the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, contravene the Establishment Clause.Majority · 448 U.S. at 319-320
Abortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life.Majority · 448 U.S. at 325
When viewed in the context of the Medicaid program to which it is appended, it is obvious that the Hyde Amendment is nothing less than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the Constitution and achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could not do directly.Dissent · 448 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting)

The direct challenge to the Hyde Amendment. The Court upheld it even as applied to some medically necessary abortions, rejected the claim that it established religion, and held that a woman's freedom to choose does not include a right to public money to exercise it.

Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official U.S. Reports page scan (Library of Congress); wording cross-checked against the Cornell LII text; page numbers from the scan. Source

Rust v. Sullivan

500 U.S. 173 (1991) · Decided 1991-05-23 · 5-4 · Opinion by Rehnquist, C.J. (joined by White, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, JJ.); dissents by Blackmun, J. (joined by Marshall, J.; by O'Connor, J., as to Part I; by Stevens, J., as to Parts II and III), Stevens, J., and O'Connor, J.
What it held
The regulations were a permissible reading of §1008 of the Public Health Service Act ('none of the funds ... shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning'), and they did not violate the First Amendment or a woman's Fifth Amendment rights.
Why
The government may fund one programme without funding the alternative; that is choosing what to pay for, not discriminating by viewpoint. Grantees remain free to provide abortion-related services outside the Title X project, with separate funds. Under Maher, McRae and Webster, the government has no duty to commit resources to abortion.
Status
Still good law on the constitutional question. Whether the 1988-type rule is in force is a matter of regulation and has changed with administrations (see unverified).
In the Court's words
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.Majority · 500 U.S. at 193
This is not a case of the Government "suppressing a dangerous idea," but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of its scope.Majority · 500 U.S. at 194
The Government has no affirmative duty to "commit any resources to facilitating abortions,"Majority · 500 U.S. at 201 (quoting Webster, 492 U.S. at 511)
This type of intrusive, ideologically based regulation of speech goes far beyond the narrow lobbying limitations approved in Regan, and cannot be justified simply because it is a condition upon the receipt of a governmental benefit.Dissent · 500 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)

Upheld the 1988 Title X regulations that barred federally funded family-planning projects from counselling or referring for abortion as a method of family planning. It extends Maher and McRae from paying for abortions to paying for abortion-related speech within a funded program.

Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official U.S. Reports page scan (Library of Congress); wording cross-checked against the Cornell LII text; page numbers from the scan. Note: the official scan at 193 reads 'an alternative program'; the LII text has 'an alternate program'. The quote follows the official U.S. Reports. Source

Hyde Amendment (current text)statute

U.S. Congress, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, Pub. L. 119-75, div. B (Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2026), title V, §§506-507, 140 Stat. 317 (Feb. 3, 2026); continued into fiscal year 2027 by the Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027 (H.R. 6500), div. A, §101(8), through December 11, 2026
Sec. 506. (a) None of the funds appropriated in this Act, and none of the funds in any trust fund to which funds are appropriated in this Act, shall be expended for any abortion. (b) None of the funds appropriated in this Act, and none of the funds in any trust fund to which funds are appropriated in this Act, shall be expended for health benefits coverage that includes coverage of abortion. … Sec. 507. (a) The limitations established in the preceding section shall not apply to an abortion— (1) if the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest; or (2) in the case where a woman suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, that would, as certified by a physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion is performed. (b) Nothing in the preceding section shall be construed as prohibiting the expenditure by a State, locality, entity, or private person of State, local, or private funds (other than a State's or locality's contribution of Medicaid matching funds). … (d)(1) None of the funds made available in this Act may be made available to a Federal agency or program, or to a State or local government, if such agency, program, or government subjects any institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.

This is the Hyde Amendment as it stands in the latest full-year appropriations act. §506 is the funding ban; §507(a) the three exceptions (rape, incest, life of the mother); §507(b)-(c) leave states and private payers free to fund abortion; §507(d) (the Weldon amendment) protects health-care entities that decline to provide, pay for, cover or refer for abortion. Because it is an appropriations rider it must be re-enacted each year. For fiscal year 2027 (from 1 October 2026), the stopgap act continues the 2026 Labor-HHS act 'under the authority and conditions provided in such Acts' through December 11, 2026, excepting only §528, so §§506-507 carry forward.

Checked 2026-10-03: Read §§506-507 in the official public law text (GPO govinfo, Pub. L. 119-75, 140 Stat. 317); read §§101 and 106 of the enrolled H.R. 6500 at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr6500enr/html/BILLS-119hr6500enr.htm for the FY2027 continuation. GPO margin notes ('<<NOTE: Abortion.>>') omitted from the quote. Source
What the other side argues
They say
Denying Medicaid coverage coerces poor women into childbirth, so a right that only the well-off can use is no right at all.
Brennan, J., dissenting in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 483, and in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 329-337
Answer
This is the strongest objection and it should be met with care, not dismissed. The Court's answer was that government does not create poverty and has no constitutional duty to pay for every protected choice (McRae, 448 U.S. at 316). For pro-lifers the further answer is moral: if the unborn child is a human being, public money should not pay to end that life, and the honest response to a poor woman's situation is to pay generously for the alternative (prenatal care, birth, support), which is exactly the choice Maher said governments may make. Card E36 sets out that plan.
They say
The Hyde Amendment is religion written into law, mainly Catholic doctrine.
Argued by the plaintiffs in Harris v. McRae; see 448 U.S. at 319-320
Answer
The Court rejected this: a law does not become religious because it matches what some churches teach, any more than theft laws do (448 U.S. at 319). Opposition to abortion rests on a claim about a living human being that can be argued from embryology and ethics without scripture. See card E09.
They say
Rust lets government buy doctors' silence and keep women from information about a legal option.
Blackmun, J., dissenting in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 207-211
Answer
The majority held that the rule governed only what the government-funded project does; the grantee could still provide abortion-related services through activities 'separate and independent from the project that receives Title X funds' (500 U.S. at 196). Whether the rule is wise policy is debatable; the holding is that refusing to pay for something is not censoring it.
They say
Hyde has exceptions, so pro-lifers already accept that some abortions should be funded.
A common policy argument; the exceptions are in §507(a)
Answer
Fair point to raise. The exceptions are a political compromise in an annual spending bill, not a statement that those children have less worth. Many pro-life advocates think the rape and incest exceptions are inconsistent with their own premise; the life-of-the-mother exception is different in kind (see card E07), because treating a life-threatening condition is not the same act as an elective abortion.
Practise with these cards
E42 Abortion is only about 3% of what Planned Parenthood does. It does cancer screenings and STI testing, and in rural areas it's often the only clinic women have. Defunding it hurts poor women.
E36 So you ban abortion. What's your plan for all those babies born to poor, struggling mothers?
E09 Don't force your religion on me.