Between Roe and Dobbs, the Court kept redrawing how much a State could regulate abortion. Webster (1989) upheld Missouri's limits on public money, staff and hospitals for abortion and declined to strike down the statute's preamble declaring that 'The life of each human being begins at conception'; a plurality also questioned Roe's viability line. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) struck down Texas's admitting-privileges and surgical-centre rules, holding that courts must weigh a law's medical benefits against the burdens it places on access. June Medical (2020) struck down Louisiana's nearly identical admitting-privileges law, but only because Chief Justice Roberts, who thought Hellerstedt was wrongly decided, voted to follow it as precedent. Dobbs (2022) overruled Roe and Casey, and the undue-burden test these cases applied went with them.
What this settles
A State may declare in its own law that human life begins at conception and may protect the unborn in tort and probate law. Webster refused to strike down the Missouri preamble, reading it as a value judgment favouring childbirth that did not itself regulate abortion (492 U.S. at 506). Even under Roe, 'Nothing in the Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the business of performing abortions' (492 U.S. at 510). Hellerstedt and June Medical show what courts did to clinic-safety laws under the undue-burden test, and why Dobbs replaced that test with rational-basis review.
What it doesn't settle
Webster did not hold that the preamble's statement about when life begins is binding on federal courts, or that the unborn are constitutional persons. It left the preamble's meaning to Missouri's courts and said federal courts could address it later 'should it be applied to restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way' (492 U.S. at 506). Hellerstedt did not decide that abortion clinics need no safety regulation; it found these two rules did not provide enough benefit on that record. Dobbs's holding overruled Roe and Casey by name; Hellerstedt and June Medical fell with the Casey framework they applied. Whether particular clinic rules are wise is now a policy question for legislatures.
The record
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
492 U.S. 490 (1989) · Decided 1989-07-03 · 5-4 · Opinion by Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court as to Parts I, II-A, II-B (joined by White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, JJ.) and II-C (unanimous); plurality as to Parts II-D and III (joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.); O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment; Blackmun, J. (joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.), and Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
What it held
Reversed the Court of Appeals. (1) The Court did not need to pass on the constitutionality of the preamble ('life of each human being begins at conception'), because it did not regulate abortion by its own terms and could be read as a permissible value judgment favouring childbirth. (2) A State may bar public employees and public facilities from performing abortions not needed to save the mother's life. (3) The challenge to the ban on public funds for 'encouraging or counseling' abortion was moot. (4) Upheld the requirement of viability testing from 20 weeks (the reasoning on this point was a plurality only).
Why
On the preamble, the Court said the 'Akron dictum' that a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins only meant a State could not use that theory to justify an abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe. Roe itself allowed protection of the unborn in tort and probate law, and Maher allowed a State to favour childbirth. On public facilities, the Court applied Maher and McRae: the State is choosing what to do with its own resources. The three-Justice plurality would have discarded Roe's trimester framework and saw no reason why the State's interest in potential life should begin only at viability. Justice Scalia would have overruled Roe outright; Justice O'Connor declined to reconsider Roe until a case actually required it.
Status
Its funding and public-facilities holdings remain good law. Its Roe-related reasoning was overtaken by Casey (1992) and then by Dobbs (2022), which overruled Roe. The Missouri preamble was not struck down by the Court.
"1. The general assembly of this state finds that: "(1) The life of each human being begins at conception; "(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and wellbeing;
In the Court's words
Certainly the preamble does not by its terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of appellees' medical practice. The Court has emphasized that Roe v. Wade "implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion."Majority · 492 U.S. at 506
It will be time enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be applied to restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way.Majority · 492 U.S. at 506
Nothing in the Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the business of performing abortions.Majority · 492 U.S. at 510
we do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.Plurality · 492 U.S. at 519
It thus appears that the mansion of constitutionalized abortion law, constructed overnight in Roe v. Wade, must be disassembled doorjamb by doorjamb, and never entirely brought down, no matter how wrong it may be.Concurrence · 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)
I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.Dissent · 492 U.S. at 566 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided.Dissent · 492 U.S. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
The quote is the Missouri statute's preamble (Mo. Rev. Stat. §1.205.1) as the Court printed it (492 U.S. at 504). The Court of Appeals had struck it down; the Supreme Court reversed, declining to rule on the preamble because it did not by itself regulate abortion. Webster is the high point of state regulation before Casey and the first time a plurality openly questioned Roe's trimester and viability lines.
Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official U.S. Reports page scan (Library of Congress); wording cross-checked against the Cornell LII text; page numbers from the scan. Source
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt
579 U.S. 582 (2016) · Decided 2016-06-27 · 5-3 · Opinion by Breyer, J. (joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, JJ.); Ginsburg, J., concurring; Thomas, J., dissenting; Alito, J. (joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.), dissenting. Decided with one seat vacant after Justice Scalia's death.
What it held
Both the admitting-privileges requirement and the surgical-centre requirement placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion, were an undue burden, and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Res judicata did not bar the challenge.
Why
Under Casey, courts must 'consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer', and must not simply defer to the legislature on disputed medical questions. On the trial record the Court found the rules brought little or no health benefit while the number of clinics fell by about half, increasing travel distances and crowding.
Status
No longer the governing test. Dobbs (2022) overruled Casey, on which the balancing test rested, and replaced it with rational-basis review for abortion laws.
In the Court's words
We conclude that neither of these provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each imposes.Majority · 579 U.S. at 591
The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.Majority · 579 U.S. at 607
Gosnell's behavior was terribly wrong. But there is no reason to believe that an extra layer of regulation would have affected that behavior.Majority · 579 U.S. at 615
Given those realities, it is beyond rational belief that H. B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law "would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions."Concurrence · 579 U.S. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
Today's decision will prompt some to claim victory, just as it will stiffen opponents' will to object. But the entire Nation has lost something essential.Dissent · 579 U.S. at 643 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
The law was one of many enacted by States in the wake of the Kermit Gosnell scandal, in which a physician who ran an abortion clinic in Philadelphia was convicted for the first-degree murder of three infants who were born alive and for the manslaughter of a patient.Dissent · 579 U.S. at 668 (Alito, J., dissenting)
Texas's 2013 law (H.B. 2) required abortion doctors to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles and abortion facilities to meet ambulatory-surgical-centre standards. The Court struck down both, holding that courts must weigh benefits against burdens. The dissent pointed out that such laws were passed after the Gosnell case; the majority answered that Gosnell's clinic had gone uninspected for years and that existing Texas law already required inspection.
Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official bound volume 579 of the U.S. Reports (supremecourt.gov PDF); page numbers from the volume. The PDF text layer drops 'fi'/'ffi' ligatures (e.g. 'benefts', 'suffcient', 'frst', 'diffcult'); these are restored in the quotes. Source
June Medical Services L. L. C. v. Russo
591 U.S. 299 (2020) · Decided 2020-06-29 · 5-4 · Opinion by Breyer, J., plurality (joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, JJ.); Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment; dissents by Thomas, J.; Alito, J. (joined by Gorsuch, J., by Thomas, J., in part, and by Kavanaugh, J., in part); Gorsuch, J.; and Kavanaugh, J.
What it held
Louisiana's requirement that abortion doctors hold admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles was unconstitutional. The clinics and doctors could raise their patients' rights (third-party standing).
Why
The plurality applied Hellerstedt's balancing and found the law nearly identical to Texas's, with the same burdens and no significant benefit. Roberts concurred only in the result: stare decisis required treating like cases alike, but he said Casey did not call for courts to weigh costs and benefits; the question was only whether a law imposes a substantial obstacle. Lower courts then divided over which test controlled.
Status
Superseded by Dobbs (2022), which overruled the Casey undue-burden framework. Justice Thomas's concurrence in FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (2024) cites June Medical, 591 U.S. 299, on the separate issue of third-party standing.
In the Court's words
This case is similar to, nearly identical with, Whole Woman's Health. And the law must consequently reach a similar conclusion. Act 620 is unconstitutional.Plurality · slip op. 40 (opinion of Breyer, J.)
I joined the dissent in Whole Woman's Health and continue to believe that the case was wrongly decided. The question today however is not whether Whole Woman's Health was right or wrong, but whether to adhere to it in deciding the present case.Concurrence · slip op. 2 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment)
Nothing about Casey suggested that a weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion regulation was a job for the courts.Concurrence · slip op. 6 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment)
Roe is grievously wrong for many reasons, but the most fundamental is that its core holding—that the Constitution protects a woman's right to abort her unborn child—finds no support in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.Dissent · slip op. 16 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
In both, the abortion right recognized in this Court's decisions is used like a bulldozer to flatten legal rules that stand in the way.Dissent · slip op. 1 (Alito, J., dissenting)
Louisiana's Act 620 copied Texas's admitting-privileges rule. Four Justices struck it down under Hellerstedt; the Chief Justice supplied the fifth vote only out of respect for precedent, while rejecting Hellerstedt's benefits-versus-burdens balancing. That split left the governing test unclear until Dobbs.
Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official slip opinion PDF from supremecourt.gov; page numbers are slip-opinion pages (each separate opinion is paginated from 1). The 591 U.S. 299 citation is confirmed by its use in Justice Thomas's concurrence in FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (slip op. 2). Source
What the other side argues
They say
Clinic-safety laws like H.B. 2 were a pretext: abortion is very safe, these rules gave no real health benefit, and their purpose was to close clinics.
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. at 591, 607-627; Ginsburg, J., concurring, 579 U.S. at 627-628
Answer
The trial court did find little measurable benefit on that record, and the dissent's reply was mostly about procedure (res judicata) and what caused the closures, not a showing that the rules saved lives. Pro-lifers should not overclaim. The fair points are: (1) the laws followed a real scandal, and the Philadelphia grand jury had recommended exactly this kind of standard (579 U.S. at 668, Alito, J., dissenting); (2) under Hellerstedt, federal judges were second-guessing legislatures on medical questions in a way Roberts said Casey never required (June Medical, Roberts concurrence, slip op. 6); (3) after Dobbs such laws are judged by the ordinary rational-basis standard, as other health regulations are.
They say
A State declaring that 'life begins at conception' is imposing a religious belief.
Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part in Webster, 492 U.S. at 566
Answer
Only Justice Stevens took that view; the Court did not adopt it. That a human organism's life begins at fertilisation is a statement of embryology, not theology (see the 'When does a human life begin?' topic). Whether that life has rights is a moral question, but moral judgments in law are not establishments of religion, as Harris v. McRae held about the Hyde Amendment (448 U.S. at 319).
They say
Webster shows the Court was eroding women's rights by stealth.
Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part in Webster, 492 U.S. at 537-560
Answer
Blackmun's prediction that Roe would not survive the plurality's reasoning proved right in the end. But Webster's holdings were modest: a State need not use its own hospitals and staff for abortions, and may say in its laws that it values unborn life. The disagreement was about whether the Constitution decided the question at all, which Dobbs answered.
Practise with these cards
E16 It's legal. It's a woman's right. E31 Before viability it can't survive without her body, so it's her decision. That's why Roe drew the line at viability. E32 Until it's born, it has no rights. It's part of the woman's body. If it were a person, there'd be laws protecting it, and there aren't. E09 Don't force your religion on me. E43 Nobody kills babies after they're born. That's a lie Trump made up to scare people. Infanticide is already illegal.