Roe, Casey and Dobbs: how abortion law got here

In 1973 Roe v. Wade (with its companion Doe v. Bolton) created a constitutional right to abortion and replaced state abortion laws with a trimester framework tied to viability. In 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey kept Roe's 'essential holding' and the viability line, dropped the trimesters, and adopted the 'undue burden' test, largely out of respect for precedent. In 2022 Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization overruled both. In the Court's own terms: 'The Constitution makes no reference to abortion', a right not named in the Constitution must be 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition', and abortion was a crime in three-quarters of the States when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The Court called Roe 'egregiously wrong from the start' and found that five stare decisis factors weighed in favour of overruling it.

What this settles
At the federal constitutional level there is no right to abortion. States (and, within its powers, Congress) may allow, limit or prohibit abortion, and a court reviewing an abortion law asks only whether it has a rational basis tied to legitimate interests, which the Court listed as including 'respect for and preservation of prenatal life at all stages of development' and the protection of maternal health (Dobbs, slip op. 77-78). The viability line and the undue-burden test are gone.
What it doesn't settle
Dobbs did not ban abortion; Kavanaugh's concurrence says it 'does not outlaw abortion throughout the United States', and the law now varies widely from state to state (including state constitutional rulings and ballot measures). Dobbs also did not hold that the unborn are 'persons' under the Fourteenth Amendment: the majority said its opinion 'is not based on any view about if and when prenatal life is entitled to any of the rights enjoyed after birth' (slip op. 38), and Kavanaugh wrote that no Justice has ever taken the position that the Constitution outlaws abortion. Roe's statement that 'person' 'does not include the unborn' (410 U.S. at 158) belonged to a decision now overruled, but the Supreme Court has not taken up the personhood question since. Other questions were left for later cases; Kavanaugh wrote that, in his view, a State may not bar residents from travelling to another State for an abortion (concurrence, slip op. 10), but that was his view, not the Court's holding, and it does not address the moral question, which the Court called 'a profound moral question'.
The record

Roe v. Wade

410 U.S. 113 (1973) · Decided 1973-01-22 · 7-2 · Opinion by Blackmun, J. (joined by Burger, C.J., Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, JJ.); dissents by White, J. (joined by Rehnquist, J.) and Rehnquist, J.
What it held
Texas's law banning abortion except to save the mother's life violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 'right of privacy' includes a woman's decision whether to end a pregnancy, but that right is 'qualified'. The Court set a trimester framework: in the first trimester the decision is left to the woman and her doctor; after that the State may regulate to protect maternal health; after viability the State may ban abortion, but must allow it where needed for the mother's life or health. The Court also said the word 'person' in the Fourteenth Amendment 'does not include the unborn'.
Why
The Court found the privacy right in the Fourteenth Amendment's 'concept of personal liberty' (or possibly the Ninth Amendment) and held it 'broad enough to encompass' abortion. It weighed this against two state interests, maternal health and 'the potentiality of human life', each becoming 'compelling' at a different stage: maternal health at about the end of the first trimester, because early abortion mortality was then thought lower than childbirth mortality; potential life at viability, because the fetus 'then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb'. On personhood the Court looked at how 'person' is used elsewhere in the Constitution and at the 19th-century history of abortion law and concluded the unborn were not included.
Status
Overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022). Its trimester framework had already been rejected in Casey (1992).
In the Court's words
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.Majority · 410 U.S. at 153 (Part VIII)
If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument.Majority · 410 U.S. at 156-157 (Part IX-A)
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.Majority · 410 U.S. at 159 (Part IX-B)
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. (c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.Majority · 410 U.S. at 164-165 (Part XI)
In Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, procedural requirements contained in one of the modern abortion statutes are considered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be read together.Majority · 410 U.S. at 165 (Part XI)
The decision here to break pregnancy into three distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the State may impose in each one, for example, partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.Dissent · 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)

Roe created a constitutional right to abortion out of the 'right of privacy' and replaced every state's abortion law with a Court-made trimester scheme. It declined to say when life begins, and it openly conceded that if the unborn child were a constitutional 'person', the case for the abortion right would collapse. Note: Roe did not decide when life begins; it said it 'need not resolve' that question.

Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official U.S. Reports page scan (Library of Congress, vol. 410) for page numbers, cross-checked against the full text at Cornell LII. Also confirmed: 'the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn' (p. 158) and Rehnquist's 'the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with respect to this matter' (p. 177). Source

Doe v. Bolton

410 U.S. 179 (1973) · Decided 1973-01-22 · 7-2 · Opinion by Blackmun, J.; dissents by White, J. (joined by Rehnquist, J.; it applies to Roe as well) and Rehnquist, J.
What it held
Georgia's newer, reform-style abortion law was partly struck down: the requirements that abortions be done in an accredited hospital, be approved by a hospital abortion committee, be confirmed by two other doctors, and be limited to Georgia residents were unconstitutional. The Court rejected the claim that the law's test (a doctor's 'best clinical judgment' that an abortion is 'necessary') was too vague, because that medical judgment may take in all factors relevant to the patient's well-being.
Why
Applying Roe, the Court held the extra procedural hurdles were not justified by the State's interest in health and burdened the patient's choice of her own physician. On vagueness, it read 'necessary' broadly: a doctor's medical judgment may consider physical, emotional, psychological, familial and age-related factors, which 'may relate to health'.
Status
Its constitutional basis (the right recognised in Roe) was repudiated in Dobbs (2022). Dobbs's holding names Roe and Casey; it does not separately name Doe, but discusses it (slip op. 27, n. 40).
In the Court's words
We agree with the District Court, 319 F. Supp., at 1058, that the medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age—relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical judgment.Majority · 410 U.S. at 192 (Part IV-C)
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes.Dissent · 410 U.S. at 221-222 (White, J., dissenting; also applies to Roe)
As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.Dissent · 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting)
This issue, for the most part, should be left with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs.Dissent · 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting)

Roe's companion case, decided the same day; Roe says the two 'are to be read together'. Its broad reading of 'health' is why critics say Roe-era law allowed abortion after viability whenever a doctor judged it necessary. Be careful: the passage is about a doctor's medical judgment under Georgia's statute (in answer to a vagueness challenge), not a holding that abortion is allowed 'for any reason'. Even Dobbs only says Doe 'has been interpreted by some' that way.

Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official U.S. Reports page scan (Library of Congress, vol. 410) and cross-checked with Cornell LII full text. The White dissent carries the note '[This opinion applies also to No. 70-18, Roe v. Wade]'. Dobbs's comment on Doe confirmed in the Dobbs slip opinion, p. 27, n. 40. Source

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey

505 U.S. 833 (1992) · Decided 1992-06-29 · 5-4 to reaffirm Roe's essential holding; the Court upheld most of Pennsylvania's law (7-2 on some parts) and struck down spousal notification 5-4 · Opinion by Joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ. (Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined parts); Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J. each wrote opinions concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by White and Thomas, JJ. (and each other)
What it held
Roe's 'essential holding' was reaffirmed: a woman may choose abortion before viability without undue interference from the State; after viability the State may restrict abortion if the law has exceptions for the woman's life or health; and the State has legitimate interests from the outset in the woman's health and the life of the fetus. The trimester framework was rejected and replaced with the 'undue burden' standard (a law is invalid if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion). Pennsylvania's informed-consent rule, 24-hour waiting period, parental consent with judicial bypass, and reporting rules were upheld; the spousal-notification rule was struck down.
Why
The joint opinion relied heavily on stare decisis: Roe had not proven unworkable; people had relied on it ('organized intimate relationships and made choices ... in reliance on the availability of abortion'); and overruling it under political pressure would damage the Court's legitimacy. It grounded the right in the 'liberty' of the Due Process Clause rather than Roe's 'privacy', and kept viability as the line because it was Roe's 'central holding' and because the fetus can then survive outside the womb.
Status
Overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022).
In the Court's words
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.Majority · 505 U.S. at 844 (Part I)
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.Majority · 505 U.S. at 851 (Part II)
Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted.Majority · 505 U.S. at 852 (Part II)
... Roe's central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.Majority · 505 U.S. at 860 (Part III-A)
We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe.Plurality · 505 U.S. at 873 (Part IV)
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.Plurality · 505 U.S. at 877 (Part IV)
We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.Dissent · 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so. The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.Dissent · 505 U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)

Casey kept Roe's 'essential holding' and the viability line, dropped the trimester framework, and replaced strict scrutiny with the 'undue burden' test. It kept Roe largely on stare decisis grounds. Note on labels: the 'mystery of human life' passage (Part II) and the reaffirmation of Roe (Parts I and III) were opinions of the Court; the undue-burden standard and the rejection of the trimester framework (Part IV) were only a three-Justice plurality, which became the controlling test.

Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official U.S. Reports page scan (Library of Congress, vol. 505) for wording and page numbers, cross-checked against Cornell LII full text. Part labels taken from the Court's own line-up ('delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI ... and an opinion with respect to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D'), 505 U.S. at 843. Source

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization

597 U.S. 215 (2022); No. 19-1392 · Decided 2022-06-24 · 6-3 to uphold Mississippi's 15-week law; 5-4 to overrule Roe and Casey · Opinion by Alito, J., for the Court (joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, JJ.); Thomas, J. and Kavanaugh, J. concurring; Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment; Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., jointly dissenting
What it held
The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Roe and Casey are overruled, and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives. Abortion laws are now reviewed under rational-basis review like other health and welfare laws, and Mississippi's Gestational Age Act (banning most abortions after 15 weeks) is valid.
Why
(1) Text and history: the Constitution does not mention abortion; an unenumerated right protected by the Due Process Clause must be 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' (Washington v. Glucksberg). Abortion was a crime at least after quickening at common law, and by 1868 three-quarters of the States made it a crime at any stage; that consensus lasted until Roe. (2) Abortion differs from the privacy cases (contraception, marriage, intimacy) because it destroys what Roe and Casey called 'potential life'. (3) Equal protection: under Geduldig and Bray, abortion regulation is not a sex-based classification. (4) Stare decisis does not save Roe and Casey, because five factors weigh in favour of overruling: the nature of their error, the quality of their reasoning, workability, disruptive effect on other areas of law, and the absence of concrete reliance. (5) Concern about public perception cannot control the Court's decision.
Status
Current law (binding precedent).
In the Court's words
We therefore hold that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Roe and Casey must be overruled, and the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the people and their elected representatives.Majority · Slip op. 69 (end of Part IV)
The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”Majority · Slip op. 5 (introduction), quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)
By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, three-quarters of the States had made abortion a crime at any stage of pregnancy, and the remaining States would soon follow.Majority · Slip op. 16 (Part II-B-1)
Roe was egregiously wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences. And far from bringing about a national settlement of the abortion issue, Roe and Casey have enflamed debate and deepened division.Majority · Slip op. 6 (introduction)
In this case, five factors weigh strongly in favor of overruling Roe and Casey: the nature of their error, the quality of their reasoning, the “workability” of the rules they imposed on the country, their disruptive effect on other areas of the law, and the absence of concrete reliance.Majority · Slip op. 43 (Part III)
A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.” ... It must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests.Majority · Slip op. 77 (Part VI-A)
Our opinion is not based on any view about if and when prenatal life is entitled to any of the rights enjoyed after birth.Majority · Slip op. 38 (Part II-D-3)
On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral and leaves the issue for the people and their elected representatives to resolve through the democratic process in the States or Congress.Concurrence · Kavanaugh, J., concurring, slip op. 2-3
To be clear, then, the Court’s decision today does not outlaw abortion throughout the United States.Concurrence · Kavanaugh, J., concurring, slip op. 3
I would take a more measured course. I agree with the Court that the viability line established by Roe and Casey should be discarded under a straightforward stare decisis analysis. That line never made any sense.Concurrence · Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment, slip op. 1
I would decide the question we granted review to answer—whether the previously recognized abortion right bars all abortion restrictions prior to viability, such that a ban on abortions after fifteen weeks of pregnancy is necessarily unlawful. The answer to that question is no, and there is no need to go further to decide this case.Concurrence · Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment, slip op. 12
Today, the Court discards that balance. It says that from the very moment of fertilization, a woman has no rights to speak of. A State can force her to bring a pregnancy to term, even at the steepest personal and familial costs.Dissent · Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting, slip op. 2
Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result of today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens.Dissent · Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting, slip op. 4
Those responsible for the original Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, did not perceive women as equals, and did not recognize women’s rights. When the majority says that we must read our foundational charter as viewed at the time of ratification (except that we may also check it against the Dark Ages), it consigns women to second-class citizenship.Dissent · Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting, slip op. 15
With sorrow—for this Court, but more, for the many millions of American women who have today lost a fundamental constitutional protection—we dissent.Dissent · Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting, slip op. 60

Dobbs held there is no federal constitutional right to abortion and overruled Roe and Casey, returning the question to the States and Congress. It did NOT ban abortion and did NOT hold that the unborn are constitutional persons; the majority said its opinion 'is not based on any view about if and when prenatal life is entitled to any of the rights enjoyed after birth'. Pin cites are to the official slip opinion (pages and Parts), since that is the text checked.

Checked 2026-10-03: Read in the official slip opinion PDF from supremecourt.gov (No. 19-1392, June 24, 2022), text extracted and searched; page numbers are slip-opinion pages and Part letters were read from the opinion's own headings. The bound 597 U.S. pagination was not checked, so U.S. Reports pin cites are not given. Source
What the other side argues
They say
Overruling Roe ignores half a century of reliance. Women have built their education, careers and families on the assumption that abortion would be available if contraception failed; 'The interests women have in Roe and Casey are perfectly, viscerally concrete.'
Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215 (2022) (Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting), slip op. 47-48, 53, drawing on Casey, 505 U.S. at 856
Answer
This is the dissent's strongest stare decisis point and it is real: people did plan around Roe. The majority's reply is that the reliance Casey itself conceded was not the traditional kind ('getting an abortion is generally "unplanned activity"'), and that weighing the 'effect of the abortion right on society and in particular on the lives of women' is an empirical and moral dispute for legislatures, not courts (slip op. 64-65). Our honest addition: a reliance argument assumes what is in dispute. If the unborn child is a human being with a claim to protection, reliance on being able to end that life cannot settle the question, just as reliance on other past wrongs did not.
They say
Tying liberty to 1868 freezes the Constitution at a time when women could not vote and were not seen as equals; the same history test would have blocked Loving (interracial marriage) and Obergefell.
Dobbs (joint dissent), slip op. 15-18, quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015)
Answer
The history-and-tradition test is a limit on judges, not a claim that 1868 was just. The majority's point is that when the Constitution is silent, judges should not create rights the people never adopted; Kavanaugh agreed the Constitution 'does not freeze the American people's rights as of 1791 or 1868' but said new rights come through legislation and constitutional amendment (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, slip op. 4). And the 1868 abortion laws were not a holdover of women's exclusion: they were 19th-century laws protecting the unborn, and the majority found 'ample evidence that the passage of these laws was instead spurred by a sincere belief that abortion kills a human being' (slip op. 29). Honest note: Glucksberg's test is contested, and Obergefell itself said it was 'inconsistent' with the approach used for marriage and intimacy.
They say
Abortion bans discriminate on the basis of sex, because only women get pregnant, so they should get heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Brief for the United States and Brief for Equal Protection Constitutional Law Scholars as amici, discussed in Dobbs, slip op. 10-11
Answer
Dobbs held the argument is 'squarely foreclosed by our precedents': regulating a procedure only one sex can undergo is not a sex classification unless it is a pretext for discrimination (Geduldig v. Aiello), and 'the "goal of preventing abortion" does not constitute "invidiously discriminatory animus" against women' (Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic). Neither Roe nor Casey relied on this theory. Honest note: this is a live academic argument, and a future Court could revisit Geduldig, but it is not current law.
They say
If there is no right to abortion because it is not 'deeply rooted', then Griswold (contraception), Lawrence and Obergefell are next. Justice Thomas even said so.
Dobbs (joint dissent), slip op. 4-5, 25-27; Thomas, J., concurring, slip op. 3 ('in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court's substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell')
Answer
The majority answered directly: abortion is different because it destroys what Roe and Casey called 'potential life'; 'None of the other decisions cited by Roe and Casey involved the critical moral question posed by abortion' and its conclusion 'does not undermine them in any way' (slip op. 32); 'Nothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion' (slip op. 66). Kavanaugh added that overruling Roe 'does not threaten or cast doubt on those precedents' (concurrence, slip op. 10). Thomas wrote only for himself; no other Justice joined his concurrence. Honest note: the dissent's logical worry is not silly, since the majority's test is about history, but the line the majority drew, the taking of a human life, is exactly the line the pro-life case is built on.
They say
Even granting the 15-week law should stand, the Court went further than it needed to; it could have upheld Mississippi's law and dropped the viability line without overruling Roe entirely.
Dobbs, Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment, slip op. 1-2, 12
Answer
The majority replied that a 'reasonable opportunity' rule has no basis of its own: it is not shown to be 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition', and if the Constitution protects a right to obtain an abortion, the concurrence does not explain why that right should end once 'reasonable' women would have had the chance to decide (slip op. 75). The parties also framed the choice that way: Mississippi asked the Court to overrule Roe and Casey, and the respondents said 'no half-measures' were available (slip op. 8). Roberts's view is a serious one about judicial restraint, but it would have left the Court drawing gestational lines again, which is what Roe did.
Practise with these cards
E08 You're a man. You don't get an opinion on this.
E16 It's legal. It's a woman's right.
E17 If you ban it, women will just die in back-alley abortions.
E29 If abortion is murder, why don't you want women who get one to go to prison? If I hire a hitman, I go to prison. So what should happen to me?
E30 Even if abortion is wrong, that doesn't mean it should be illegal. Lots of wrong things are legal. Like guns for conservatives, it's a necessary evil: banning it just drives it underground.
E31 Before viability it can't survive without her body, so it's her decision. That's why Roe drew the line at viability.
E32 Until it's born, it has no rights. It's part of the woman's body. If it were a person, there'd be laws protecting it, and there aren't.
E40 The anti-abortion movement was invented in the 1970s by the religious right. When they couldn't openly defend segregation or keeping women out of work anymore, they used abortion to protect white men's power.